Episode Transcript
[00:00:01] Speaker A: We are back. It has been more than a year and I actually have a backlog of so many different ideas that we have talked about for this show. I'm sure plenty of people out there thought that this thing was dead, that shitcoin Insider was not coming back, especially with no output, despite the unbelievable amount of incredible content that the shitcoin sphere literally never stops delivering. But the just, even for this episode.
[00:00:30] Speaker B: This took us like a month to.
[00:00:32] Speaker A: Put together because the Internet gods just did not want this to happen. We scheduled, we had to reschedule this thing like I think four separate times. And even then, even then, the insider was not able to make this episode. He had some family matters come up, but we went ahead anyway and he will be joining us on the next one, which we have already recorded and more episodes will be on the way. But today we have Corey Clipston. I spent an hour digging into the disaster of the Celsius, Ponzi, the Luna and Terra USD algorithmic dumpster fire and the three Arrows capital insolvency and the cascade of liquidations that went through the Defi ecosystem, all attached to this Corey. Now, Corey is the CEO and co founder of Swan Bitcoin. Everyone knows what Swan Bitcoin is, but he was one of the most consistent and outspoken and just a targeted critic of specifically these projects really and for pretty much months before all of this unfolded. And it was what brought it to my attention, actually. So we chat with him today on what. What made this outcome so clear to him and how can we, as bitcoiners and shitcoin spectators, make sense of what's happening in the space and protect our precious, precious sats? A quick thank you to Swan Bitcoin, the best bitcoin onboarding experience, Coinkite, the solution to literally all of your bitcoin hardware and device needs. And the fold card, the debit card that stacks for you on everything in your fiat life. These are. These are basically like in my absolute top companies and services in the space and they support my work so that I can do this every day and we can keep even shitcoin Insider alive with that. Let's get right into our chat with Corey Clipston. This is ShitCoin Insider, episode seven, how many degrees Celsius is a lunatic?
Bitcoin maximalists trying to make sense of the sea of shitcoins.
This is shitcoin Insider.
[00:03:03] Speaker B: All right, so one thing as. As someone who has a podcast that has not been updated in a year, but has a podcast called Shitcoin Insider, I have Done this, the Luna shit in particular really kind of came out of nowhere for me. I was not paying close attention to what was going on. Honestly, the only reason I started hearing about it was because of you.
So just, let's just start out. I want you to give me your breakdown of how, how you stumbled upon, like, what kind of caught your eye about the Luna and US Terra USD situation and why you started calling it out. Because there was nothing obvious to me. I mean, I guess it was, it was a huge project. It was a freaking huge project, but I just wasn't aware of it, I guess, you know, but give me, give me the story there. That walked us into that.
[00:03:57] Speaker C: Yeah, I mean, what, what. Basically where they effed up was trying to come near bitcoin because that meant that bitcoiners were going to take a closer look. And since they didn't have the goods and they were shady as hell, like, if you try to get close to bitcoin and you're full of shit, bitcoiners are going to take a close look and you're going to have problems because they're going to tell everybody what they find. So, you know, I mean, it was going to die anyway eventually, because there's no such thing as a decentralized whatchamacallit. Decentralized algorithm. Stablecoin is an oxymoron. Like, it literally can't be decentralized. You have to have a centralized team conducting open market operations to defend the peg. Otherwise, like, it'll die. It'll die eventually anyway. Because at some point that centralized.
[00:04:42] Speaker B: I was about to say they had a centralized entity backing it up and it still failed. Right.
[00:04:48] Speaker C: But it died a lot faster once they made the bitcoin announcement. Because then everybody started looking into it. People like me. And then a couple weeks later, Len Alden and others started writing about it and pointing out that this is an actual Ponzi scheme and it was ripe for ATT and CK from that point forward. But yeah, it was all the bitcoin podcasters and big Twitter handles like BTC Archive and stuff like that, pumping. This Pompliano in particular, you know, having Do Kwon on his show and everybody like celebrating this shitcoin buying a bunch of bitcoin and I'm like, there's no way this is going to be good. I don't know why, but I'm going to do some research this weekend and I'm going to find out exactly why this is not good for bitcoin. Because my Spidey sense is just tingling. And I've seen this guy talk now, you know, and seen what? Like, just what a scam artist he sounds like. And yeah, it took about 45 minutes, a couple of YouTube videos, and just a little bit of, you know, understanding what the dynamic was with the anchor protocol and how that worked. And it was like, oh, my God, that's a Ponzi scheme.
[00:05:46] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:05:46] Speaker C: Do you want me to just really quickly lay out what the Ponzi scheme was?
[00:05:51] Speaker B: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Why not? Cool.
[00:05:53] Speaker C: Just in case. Yeah. So basically what they had was Luna, which was just a normal, you know, layer one ethereum killer shitcoin pump and dump by Polychain and Pantera and some others. And as usual, they found some, you know, Stanford CS kid, you know, from Korea, whatever that, you know, was. Seemed like a genius, but isn't actually. And, you know, so they kind of pump that up and promote it and, you know, he built out the usual crap that all these L1s have with the automated market maker and blah, blah, blah, and all these, you know, trumped up partnerships and pretending that there's stuff going on with, you know, oh my God, we've got this partnership with Blank. And then, you know, you go check with the company and they're like, what? You know, so they had like 40 of those in a Luna ecosystem.
[00:06:35] Speaker B: They gave them a debit card. I don't.
[00:06:37] Speaker C: Right, exactly. So the usual sort of like logo vomit slides where like not one of them actually checks out. And then they decided to do a decentralized, supposedly algorithmic, stablecoin, basically copying basis, which was something that was actually like a pretty sophisticated and relatively upstanding group of, you know, well meaning, ill informed Silicon Valley types back in like 2017, 18, who to their credit, shut it down when they realized that it was an impossible thing to do without it being a centralized entity and therefore it would be a security. So they actually shut it down and refunded, you know, the 90% of the money that they'd taken from investors that they didn't spend yet, which was kind of them.
A year later, after they shut down in 2018, Do Kwon, under the pseudonym Rick Sanchez, took their code and launched Basis Cash and built it up to 65 million of assets in Basis cash, and then it went to zero. So he already had some experience with. So he already did this. He did it already, calling himself Rick Sanchez, and it went to zero.
So he decided that he would do it with Luna. And this is after Titan, which is the one that Mark Cuban pushed Through all his channels, told everybody it was going to change the world and then it went to zero. And then he called for SEC regulation to protect people like him from rugging people like the people that he rugged. So it was the exact same setup. It's basically a two asset setup where you have like a shitcoin that supposedly has some value but it has a market cap basically. And then you have the algorithmic stablecoin that's pegged one to one with on chain swaps basically from the shitcoin to the dollar coin. And essentially that arbitrage is supposed to. Arbitrageurs are supposed to keep the peg because if the, the price of UST Terra USD in this case is the, you know, the, the Do Kwon shit coin dollar, you know, falls below a dollar but it is swappable for a dollar worth of Luna or you know, at. At par basically you can always like clip that arbitrage and bring the peg back in line. Supposedly the problem is if the price of Luna starts to drop dramatically, you would want to.
I think just meant you'd. Every time you wanted to get a UST you would have to mint like insanely more Luna and you would see hyperinflation which is actually what ended up happening is you, you had a.
[00:09:13] Speaker B: It's a monetary policy that literally just prints it ends whatever the gap is, whatever the value gap is.
[00:09:19] Speaker C: Yeah. So anyway, so sustainable Some, some people who were in on the scam who are not stupid and we can't know where the line is. Some people who are in on it and knew it was a scam but knew that they'd be able to trade it for long enough and that if they pumped it up and kept it going long enough they'd make more money on the journey. They'd have a great journey and they know it would end eventually but they'd lose 10% of their profits at the end or something. So that would be like jump capital that made money trading and market making and buying cheap tokens from the Luna foundation or whatever and then selling them later, stuff like that. So they were in on it kind of the whole way. Others gray area, you know, Galaxy probably pretty in on it. Some of the people at Galaxy for sure are not stupid enough to not understand this. Very possible that Novogratz isn't sophisticated to actually understand obvious Ponzi schemes. I mean he did get a tattoo that's kind of like, you know, pretty, pretty good sign that he didn't realize what was going on. I don't know why Anybody gives them their money to manage because he blew up in tradfi and now he keeps blowing up in shitcoins.
You know, it's just one of these things like you just, you go to Princeton and you room with the right people and you're a wrestler and people keep on giving you slots and you just keep failing up. It's just like the guy like never does it and people keep on like going to work for him and giving their money. It blows my mind.
[00:10:46] Speaker B: I feel it's got to be, that's got to be like a fiat creation, right?
[00:10:50] Speaker C: It totally is. Yeah.
[00:10:51] Speaker B: It's like nobody's, nobody in Bitcoin is giving him like never give this guy.
[00:10:57] Speaker C: Your money in a million years.
So. So this is, this is what was really obvious in those, you know, the 45 minutes when I looked into it and I looked into Anchor, also turned out by the way, the, the global GM of, of Terra Labs, which creates all this shit is one of my classmates from University of Chicago. So that was a nice little nugget. He since changed his LinkedIn and said that he was like a part time consultant, but months ago it said he was general manager of Global.
Anyway, so yeah, Anchor is another protocol that, you know, Do Kwon coded in his dorm room or whatever last year. And all Anchor was is you. You check in UST, so you stake UST and they give you 20% interest risk free. Huge air quotes around the risk free, by the way.
[00:11:55] Speaker B: I mean that sounds perfectly reasonable.
[00:11:57] Speaker C: Sounds amazing, right? Sounds great.
So all I looked at is like, okay, so they're giving you 20% interest. Who's paying the 20% interest? Okay, so there's this Anchor reserve and the Anchor reserve keeps getting topped up by Luna, like the company and also by Jump Capital.
Now why would these people give away $1.5 billion over six months or so? They say it's for marketing.
You could buy every ad on the super bowl and name a couple stadiums for $1.5 billion. So what is really going on here? Like what? That's not marketing budget. You're just giving people money for free. Why would you do that? Well, you must be making more money.
Where's the squeeze? Where do you, where do you actually make that money? Oh, okay, here it is.
The market cap of Luna goes up by more than the market cap of UST as people park money in UST because it seems to dummies that it's proving the viability of the Luna UST ecosystem. So if UST market cap went from like 6 to 7. The market cap of Luna would go up from like 20 to 24. And who owns all the Luna that they printed for free and gave to themselves or sold cheaply to their partners?
[00:13:19] Speaker B: Like, jump those MO folks.
[00:13:21] Speaker C: Right, and what are they doing when the price of Luna spikes and there's high volume Luna trading days selling? They dump it. Exactly. Yeah. So we'll see exactly how much Do Kwon sold over the past year, but it appears that it's very possible it's in the billions.
Nothing he said on Twitter ever really checks out as being true. He's a duplicitous con artist with some coding skills and just a psychopathic, sociopathic ability to just lie to people's faces.
So, yeah, it's going to be a long, long trip here unpacking what exactly happened. I suspect all the big guys will get away with it, as they usually do. And in some ways, you know, they found this mechanism and they found this guy that was willing to just like. Like, it's really hard. You get people, you know, running some of these things and like, they still have a bit of a conscience, you know, so, like, you just, you. Most of these altcoins, like, you know, it takes a real sociopath like a Hoskinson or a Do Kwon to like, actually get out there and have like, this universe that they've created in their head that they can, like, expound upon and like, you know, tell all these stories about and like, you know, almost make themselves believe it to the point that, that it seems credible to people that don't look into it.
[00:14:48] Speaker A: You think Richard Hart believes it?
[00:14:50] Speaker C: Not at all. Not at all. He's. He's just playing some four. He's just. With a bunch of dummies. Yeah, he's deliberately created a filter bubble and like, he's, he, he's just using. I mean, you read like, he's literally just taking like, Robert Green books and running the playbook, you know, like 48 laws of power, the artist seduction, like the laws of human nature or whatever. Like, all, you know, those are just books that are basically like compendiums of historical stories that fit different themes and break into different topics. But all these amazing, you know, charlatans and con artists from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and stuff that would go like city state to city state and just like bring the wealth that they'd extracted from Venice and then go to Vienna, roll in looking all rich, tell people how, how to get rich like them, but actually take all their money and then roll into Paris and do it again. There's like dozens of these guys that just crushed it.
[00:15:42] Speaker B: That's literally the story of Fiat. I mean the story of crypto.
[00:15:44] Speaker C: Excuse me, that's the story of crypto. Exactly. So I, I think this, this Richard Hart thing, I mean, Jesus, he's really good at it because he created this like this character and he's just like going and just buying expensive with your money and then people are rooting for it. That's a whole other thing to unpack we can get into. But it's basically that bag holders have this incredible unconscious and conscious incentive to basically create.
[00:16:16] Speaker B: Find out why they're right.
[00:16:17] Speaker C: Cult like belief in the founder.
[00:16:20] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:16:20] Speaker C: So you get them, you know, basically they have to believe because they have so much wealth stored in Luna. They have to believe that Do Kwon is a genius and they tell everybody is you get all these people that become like massive fanboys of Machinsky and they call him the machine, the Celsius guy. And you know, they, they, they basically like promote the lies of these people. You know, that's one of like the famous tricks of a tyrant or a dictator, is they deliberately lie.
[00:16:46] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:16:46] Speaker C: And they know that once you go along with the lie, if you're like part of their crowd, then you're complicit and you are guilty too. And you will basically defend that cognitive dissonant lie that you also told to the death so that you don't have to admit to yourself and others that you also lie.
[00:17:05] Speaker B: Yeah, basically there's a lot of failure to admit to yourself like going on in all of this. And that's.
[00:17:13] Speaker C: So anyway, yeah, sorry, but let's. So let's get back to anchor and Ust so fun to go off on little tangents in this space. But.
So that's basically. That was basically the scam is that, you know, they could dump Luna. They could dump more Luna than what they were paying out to people in interest on anchor.
[00:17:35] Speaker B: So you just. And the lockup was just a supply shock to support the appearance of the narrative working 100%.
[00:17:40] Speaker C: And like the thing is, if you're only paying 20% interest, like it doesn't even have to go up by more. Just by more than like 20%.
[00:17:49] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:17:49] Speaker C: Per year. Like as long as Luna goes up a little bit, you know, as long as your Luna stack goes up by more than what you are paying out in interest in Anchor protocol and you can sell that into pumps, then you're got a money printing machine. So in a lot of ways sharing.
[00:18:06] Speaker B: Just enough of the Ponzi.
[00:18:08] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:18:08] Speaker B: With the participants to make them play along, make them stay around.
[00:18:12] Speaker C: What's kind of funny about it is, is basically an OTC desk working with a protocol, realized that they didn't need the venture capitalists. The Andreessen Horowitz is in the middle of it. For once they could get rid of the long con of building the ecosystem and, you know, convincing people of all this stuff. And you didn't need as many, like, telegram groups and, you know, Twitter bullshit. You didn't have to go, like, start, you know, windmill orphanages for orangutans in Ethiopia or whatever these shit coins usually do. You know, you didn't have to do any of that marketing crap for, like, three, four years to get your pump. You could just literally bribe people to pump your coin, you know, so that. That was the. That was the Luna Ponzi. And so these telegram groups that I'm still in, in some cases with crypto fund managers and crypto traders and stuff that I've been in for, you know, for four or five years or whatever, made reference to the Luna Ponzi back in December, January, February.
I didn't really know quite what it was, but they would just talk about the Luna Ponzi, and it was just kind of like in my head, in the back. And the other thing I noticed was all winter, since the peak in November, which was the shitcoin peak and the bitcoin peak, and then it was basically the bear market started from there over December, January, February, literally you'd go on, like, Delta app, which is where I check on shitcoin prices just out of morbid curiosity. Only one was like, in the green through the winter, literally everything was red except for Luna. And you just saw Luna and UST market caps just charging up the charts, rising from the 30s to the 20s to the teens or something like that, all the way through March, April. And, you know, so that was kind of the other thing that was like, what's going on here? Like, what's. What's the mechanism by this, by which this one is acting differently than all the rest when it claims to be like the rest. Oh, it's a Ponzi scheme.
So that was it, man. I was. I think the first time I straight out came and said it unequivocally, I believe was March 24th. And I said, this is a Ponzi and it's going to blow up. And then, you know, basically from then on, it was, you know, every day or two, every podcast, any national Media I could get just telling people that this thing was going to go to zero and it's going to blow up and it's a Ponzi scheme.
[00:20:38] Speaker B: But, sir, didn't you just accelerate it? Didn't you just. Didn't you just speed it up? Couldn't you have just kept your mouth shut and let it go on for a little while so people could get their money out?
[00:20:50] Speaker C: That's not how these things work. More money goes in and more of it blows up. Like, you got to kill these Ponzi schemes as early as possible, otherwise more people get sucked in and more people lose.
[00:21:00] Speaker B: I kept. I kept getting that response on Twitter, like from people, and seeing people in.
[00:21:04] Speaker A: Your threads saying that it's like, well.
[00:21:06] Speaker B: You just caused the bank run. You just. You made it worse.
[00:21:09] Speaker C: Yeah, well, I think that was a common. That was a common one with, with Celsius, which obviously way more people were all over Celsius from day one. Yeah, I mean, people have been on Celsius for years, you know, way before it caught my interest. Celsius. If you want to move on to that.
[00:21:26] Speaker B: So I was about to say, let's dig.
[00:21:28] Speaker C: Collapsed on. On Monday, May 9th. Later that day or the next morning, it came out that Celsius over the weekend had pulled over $500 million of user funds off of anchor.
530 something million dollars. They had escaped basically, the. The Anchor collapse over the weekend. And that's horrifying because that's like, more than the equity value of the company. There's no way they could plug a gap like that. So I was like, if they're taking risks like this, you know what else is out there? And then you're like, oh, shit, you know, do a couple Google searches, search Twitter, and you're like, oh, that Steakhound thing last summer, remember there was this thing about Steakhound, like up their custody with fireblocks and losing 120 million bucks. It turns out that was Celsius user money that they lost last summer. And then that was. And then there was the other one. There was the Badger Dao hack, which, you know, was 100 something million dollars lost 50 of that was Celsius user money. And it's like, these guys are not doing the same thing as, like, Genesis or, you know, Ledger X or whatever. They're not just lending coins out to market makers and Shorts, you know, which has a market rate. And you understand you can lend coins out to credible institutional counterparties. And, and, and that's fine.
There's a Whole other thing about it probably being unethical to gather retail deposits and lend them out to institutional borrowers because retail basically by definition doesn't understand the risks that they're taking and can't have the access on a one to one basis to question the middleman about the risks being taken with their money. So basically none of these lenders to market makers and shorts or hedge funds or whatever, let alone parking in shady defi protocols like Celsius does or did in the past when they existed.
That information asymmetry is just unethical at best. And I think, man, it's heavily regulated in, in traditional finance. I mean, what you can actually do with people's stocks, you know, like if you check the box on interactive brokers or E Trade or Robinhood or whatever, and you're like agreeing that they can lend out your, your securities to market makers and shorts and that like, you know, gives you free trading on Robinhood or gives you a tiny bit of yield or whatever on interactive Brokers, you know, so you end up with like, you know, 20 bucks or something. Like I'm always fine with that because it's heavily regulated, you know, but I'm not sitting there like wondering, you know, exactly what Citadel is doing with my money. Plus you have the backstop of if there's a blow up, you know, that the Fed is just going to print money to paper it over. Yeah, you don't have that in crypto, like, except in Luna is not a, not a bottomless pit of, of free money for everybody.
[00:24:29] Speaker B: So men, it makes me.
I actually went through all the lending platforms like I was trying to get a loan for doing housework and I was doing it against Bitcoin. And it's funny, I, for longer than I like to admit, I considered Celsius because they had the best interest rates. And you know, I did, I did all this, I was doing all this math, I had this, you know, spreadsheet out. You know, it's like how much is it going to cost for this amount of time? Blah, blah, blah, what can I expect to make and you know, manage for? You know, if the price just goes, just goes horrifically against me, how long do I need to worry about it? You know, that kind of thing. And, and it's so funny because Celsius was one of the best looking ones from the context of like interest rates. And it was just that like there was a, there was a part of me like after I was kind of trying to make the decision, I just looked at it and I was like, they have a shitcoin.
They have a shit. If. If I. If I lose everything, then I'm an absolute idiot, and I absolutely deserve it. And that was just kind of what was like, that was it. You know, I was just like, you know what? I'm. I'm. I'm absolutely. If I think this is the way to go. Just because they boast an interest rate. And after. And then at that point, it was just like, all right, which. Which one can I use that I can see my coins? Because that's the. Because then I realized that the risk is lose it all, you know, like, that's it.
And so I basically just dropped all of them and went with unchained. But y. It's funny, that shitcoin. It does it every time. Every time.
[00:26:11] Speaker C: It's. It's a pretty strong signal, you know? And if. If you got a. I mean, I think it's 100%. I mean, just like, don't do business with people that have shitcoins. It's really what it comes down to.
[00:26:25] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:26:26] Speaker C: Um. I don't know.
[00:26:27] Speaker B: You know, the Celsius thing, man, I feel so bad for some of the people in Celsius. And, like, they had one that offered 1% interest if you locked up 10 times the collateral. Like that right there is like a. Scares me from a context of like, that's like, I need money.
Like, that's like, I need. We need the capital to make up. You know, this is after stakehound and, you know, all of these things.
[00:26:53] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:26:54] Speaker B: Which makes me think they were just trying to get more and more deposits. Like somebody who's taken out, like, a one bitcoin loan, like a $30,000 loan at the time.
[00:27:02] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:27:03] Speaker B: Is locking up 10 bitcoin to do it.
[00:27:06] Speaker C: Well, you got to look at this. You know, anytime you see this, there's a lot of services that essentially hide that, you know, so they. They subsidize your fees or give you something extensively for free. But, you know, they say it's cheaper if you put your bitcoin in motion. That's one thing I've seen with a lot of these services. They'll say, like, you know, you can. You can park your bitcoin IRA with us for free if you let us put your bitcoin in motion.
By definition, that means they're risking your bitcoin. They're lending it out to somebody.
[00:27:40] Speaker B: Yeah. Yeah.
[00:27:41] Speaker C: You know, so I don't know, man. I've been warning against all these. Not because I had some, like, I've been warning against these for over two years since they started coming out and getting popular. Not because I knew for sure that they were all going to blow up or even that any specific. I was sure that some would blow up at some point and I don't think that you could know which one because there's no way that you could know who lends to who and, and who's being truthful about what they do with the money. Right. Like a lot of sophisticated people had Three Arrows Capital as a counterparty and trusted them, you know and, and very few actually looked at their books and, and stopped lending capital to Three Arrows Capital earlier this year. There are a few that actually said well you know what, we can't really see what's going on your balance sheet, you know, we're just not going to lend to you anymore. There's a handful of companies that have done that in the last couple years, but most of them didn't catch what was going on at 3 arrows. So 3 arrows had 18 billion under management in the fall. Was probably like 9 or 10 a couple of months ago, you know, and now it looks like they're insolvent and have left this massive, you know, nine or ten billion dollar hole across the lending books of the entire shitcoin lending industry.
[00:29:00] Speaker B: So yeah, tell me a little bit more about this because the Three Arrows capital is kind of the only like was really something I just did not know about and everybody just kind of talked about it like how are they connected to all of this?
[00:29:12] Speaker C: Well, so there's a guy on Twitter you've seen a lot jusu who has like half a million followers or something and he tweets about shitcoins all the time and you know, people often think that he might be tweeting so that because he's front run something he was about to tweet about or he's trying to crash something so that he can pick it up on the cheap and stuff like that. But he's been around a long time so you know some of actually read.
[00:29:36] Speaker B: A couple of his things on the show ages ago. He has some, he has some really good old articles about proof of work and like, and ownership, like sovereign ownership and stuff.
[00:29:46] Speaker C: Right. But so he and his you know, former college roommate or buddy Kyle have been in crypto since 2012 so 10 years and you know they've ridden a couple of bull markets and they ended up with a lot of capital and a reputation for whatever reason. I kind of look at this a lot like you know Someone of average talent that happened to get a job with Google in like 99 or 2000 and ended up really fucking rich, but kind of sucks, you know, call it the Tim Armstrong. You know, this guy, like went to Connecticut college, like a, kind of a, you know, a media sales guy in New York or whatever, knew enough people to run sales for Google when it was tiny. Ended up, you know, basically growing this massive pile of Google stock wealth and reputation in the, in the ad tech industry and the media industry by being the head of Google sales. And so then he leaves and they make him CEO of aol and it's like, oh, this dude was just lucky as fuck. He's a dumbass, you know, and that's basically a lot of these crypto fund managers, like, they would never make money trading against Citadel or 0.72 or whatever in traditional markets. They're just lucky to have ridden this thing up. They were willing to make the trips to Asia. They hang out in the little telegram groups for the insider pump and dumps. And like, you know, I think they just kind of, you know, rode this crypto thing up. Being an insider makes you more of an insider, basically. And so I think it's just really path dependent on, on being early. You know, there's like a, there's a real estate agent out here in LA that's managing like a billion dollars of shitcoins at this point, you know, because at one point, you know, he got in early enough in like 15, 16 and did all the trips to Asia and, you know, pulled together like 900k of his friend's money and wrote it up on a bunch of Asian shit coins, like, you know, quantum cudem, whatever, and some other ones, and got in with the hash guys in Korea and, you know, all of a sudden he's sitting on 20 mil. And then that helped him raise to 100 mil. And then he caught the, you know, cut the bull run the last couple of years and all of a sudden he's managing, you know, some massive hedge fund guy carved off like, you know, half a percent of his money and gave it to these guys. And he has a very credible. He has a credible partner with the whole private equity background now and the whole deal.
[00:32:01] Speaker B: That's crazy.
[00:32:02] Speaker C: Nice guys, by the way, other than their shitcoining. Like, it's the first guy that made me read Digital gold back in 2017. Like a week after I discovered bitcoin and crypto. They were like, there's a lot of shitcoin stuff going on. They didn't call it that. They were like, there's all these amazing ICOs. But you should start.
Sorry for kind of subtweeting you guys here because they at least did force me to start with bitcoin back in 2017.
[00:32:29] Speaker B: That's something, I guess.
[00:32:31] Speaker C: Yeah, it's something. Anyway, there's. There's some redeeming qualities there.
So. Three Arrows Capital again. So. Yeah, I mean, these guys blowing up just left a massive hole in everybody's loan books, you know, and only the. Only the ones that avoided that basically through luck. Because this was, you know, kind of a. A gold standard counterparty. This is somebody everybody lent to.
So either you avoided it through luck or through size. So Genesis is rumored to have had exposure. That's the biggest loan book in crypto and bitcoin. And, you know, they're just big enough to. To soak up the losses or to, like, work out of it, basically. But, you know, if that had become touch and go. I mean, you want to talk about crypto Winter, if Genesis went under.
Oh, dude.
[00:33:22] Speaker B: Really?
[00:33:23] Speaker C: Oh, yeah. That's. That's. That's the only one I've been keeping an eye on and just trying to, like, tap my network to see if, like, it's good. Because, like, yeah, if you. If you got an inkling that Genesis was going under, like, as a fiduciary. Well, I'm not a fiduciary of any sort, but just as a manager of, like, Swan's company Treasury, if I thought Genesis was going under, I'd probably sell some Bitcoin at 20k.
[00:33:47] Speaker B: Wow.
[00:33:48] Speaker C: Just to make sure I had a.
[00:33:49] Speaker B: Little extra cash for Deep Winter to eat it up.
[00:33:53] Speaker C: Yeah. But it looks. It looks like they are probably fine.
[00:33:57] Speaker B: Do we think. Is the unraveling of this unraveled, do you think, or, like, are we still yet to see exactly how much damage was done here?
[00:34:07] Speaker C: It's June 27th, and it's not over.
[00:34:10] Speaker B: Gotcha.
[00:34:11] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:34:12] Speaker B: So do you still think there's massive liquidations to come?
[00:34:16] Speaker C: Yes.
[00:34:17] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:34:18] Speaker C: Yeah. So Celsius froze deposits on June 12, 15 days ago, which was a Sunday, without trying to have a nice day with my family, and started getting started, getting text messages from people like, jesus, Corey, what did you do?
[00:34:37] Speaker B: Corey did it. Oh, my God.
[00:34:40] Speaker C: Again, like, of the ones with that model, if you look at, like, how risky and how risky was your business model and, like, how shitty was your operation on one axis and, like, how big are you on this axis? Like, or just. Do you check those two boxes? Do you have a Super risky business model with shitty operations and are you big? Like, Celsius was the worst on the combination of those criteria, like, by far the worst. Like Nexo is big and not quite as risky and BlockFi is big, significantly less risky. Also ran into problems if you want to show how, like, fucking inevitable this shit was. Like, blockfi was much better run than Celsius and didn't have all this crazy shit and their equity is negative. Like, it's worth less than zero.
[00:35:29] Speaker B: Wow.
[00:35:29] Speaker C: The whole company, which raised at $5 billion six months ago, is worth less than zero.
[00:35:35] Speaker B: Wow.
[00:35:36] Speaker C: Yeah. Like, you got to pay somebody.
[00:35:38] Speaker B: Do you think BlockFi is going under right now?
[00:35:40] Speaker A: Because I've been hearing a lot of rumble going under.
[00:35:43] Speaker C: I think what they're trying. So what they're trying to make sure happens is that. So first of all, I think the brand itself has enough positive equity, like enough brand recognition. It's a big consumer name that if they can make all depositors whole, make sure everybody's money is safe and that they get all their coins back. So if they can plug that, that hole in their balance sheet and make sure that they don't lose people's money, I think it will continue to exist. I think if they, you know, change management and change ownership and somebody buys the brand off the scat scrap heap, you know, I think it will continue to exist as that a company with that name.
[00:36:26] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:36:27] Speaker C: Because I think what will happen.
[00:36:29] Speaker B: But is it the same company?
[00:36:30] Speaker C: I think, I think everybody has to go, you know, and I, and I think, like, again, I still come back to like, these are financial companies. So, like, like, why.
Why do you think that someone who comes from, like, you know, gray area online marketing businesses, you know, in Asia, like the crypto.com guys, like, why are they going to be really good at managing risk? Mashinsky, who, you know, lied about raising a billion dollars, lied about $3 billion of exits, lied about being involved in the most successful IPO of 2004, lied about being the creator of voiceover Internet Protocol, lied about what he was going to do with the money for his illegal unregistered security offering, the Celsius token, and lied consistently for four years about the nature of the business, calling users depositors when they're actually unsecured creditors, saying that banks aren't your friends and that they could like. The marketing pitch for Celsius is banks are lying to you. They could easily pay you 8% interest if they wanted to, but they don't. They keep the money. They're Evil. Like, he says this shit with a straight face. There's thousands of clips of this guy saying this on YouTube and on Twitter. Right. Like, that's his speech. And only when he runs up against somebody that's like an actual, you know, who actually knows what they're talking about and doesn't care about decorum when faced with a scammer, you know, will just straight up say, dude, you're lying.
You know, I love that Peter Schiff called him out, like, yeah, it was a great clip.
[00:38:09] Speaker B: How are you making this money? How are you making this percentage?
[00:38:12] Speaker C: That's risk, dude.
[00:38:13] Speaker B: Bitcoin pays dividends. No, it doesn't.
[00:38:16] Speaker C: Yeah, doesn't.
[00:38:17] Speaker B: Obviously doesn't pay shit.
[00:38:19] Speaker C: The thing is, like, well, the reason he couldn't answer it straight is because he was not doing what you could do. You. You can lend out Bitcoin, like, on an exchange. So if you're on Binance or your Bitfinex or whatever, there's a market for borrowing Bitcoin so that people can, you know, use leverage or. Or go short or whatever. And the exchange sits in the middle and mediates that. And then there are also third parties that do that for institutions. And that's a legitimate business. It has risk.
You need to evaluate your counterparties. He couldn't just explain, like, we're just giving this to shorts and market makers, because that's not all they were doing. You're parking in a badger, Dow anchor and fucking steakhound.
[00:39:00] Speaker B: And it would be obvious, too, because they're paying too high a percentage to exactly get.
[00:39:04] Speaker A: Yeah.
[00:39:04] Speaker C: So shift. Schiff knows, like, that's going to pay, like, you know, 1% to 4% or something like that. Not 18%, 12%, 9%. Like, bullshit. Those rates don't exist in the real world without a ton of risk.
[00:39:17] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:39:18] Speaker C: Anyway, so that's. That's so Celsius. And that whole model, I think just the whole, you know, give your coins to somebody so that they can lend them out and that. That's a custodian of some sort and where people actually stored their money. I think that entire business model basically goes away for retail initially right now, because people are starting to wake up to what the risks are. Even if they were lucky enough to escape losing their coins now, the deposits should just dramatically dwindle at Voyager Nexo blockfi, which kind of survived huge capital infusions needed to keep for Voyager alive and to keep blockfi alive. It as news sort of comes out about Voyager's operation, which also has a shitcoin by the way. Respect. Blockfi doesn't have a shitcoin. Hey. There's something good about it. Hey, hey.
[00:40:16] Speaker B: Okay. All right.
[00:40:17] Speaker C: So, I mean, God, the. The stories I'm getting about Voyager, the crazy spreads they have, the just ridiculous machinations of the way that they sort of like cloud of money out of your pocket like six ways from Sunday after spending all the money.
[00:40:30] Speaker B: Are they just another like block five sort of company or something?
[00:40:33] Speaker C: They're like Celsius.
[00:40:34] Speaker B: I don't even know Voyager.
[00:40:36] Speaker C: Yeah, they're just like a crypto staking trading app. You know, horrible fees and prices and.
[00:40:41] Speaker B: Sure.
[00:40:42] Speaker C: And, you know, promising you, like, lots of money.
A friend of mine actually, you know, so Voyager dropped their maximum withdrawal to $10,000 worth of crypto per day, like a week ago, maybe 10 days ago. Anyway, a friend of mine from New York sent me screenshots withdrawing over 300 bitcoins from Voyager in late May because of my tweets.
[00:41:08] Speaker A: Jesus.
[00:41:09] Speaker C: Imagine trying to take. What is that? That's like 63 mil. So trying to take 63 mil off in 10,000 increments, it'll only take 36.7 years. I don't know. It's a lot anyway.
[00:41:26] Speaker B: Good God.
[00:41:28] Speaker C: Yeah, yeah. It would take what it would take him a year.
Two years. Be about two years of daily $10,000 withdrawals.
[00:41:38] Speaker B: That's a job. That's a full time job.
[00:41:40] Speaker C: Yeah, yeah, like set your alarm time for my Voyager withdrawal.
Oh, my God. And I bet they don't have automatic withdrawals like Swan does.
And they charge you, by the way. All these guys charge you for on chain withdrawals. And some of the times the fees are like, egregious too.
[00:42:01] Speaker B: Dude, that is. That's one of those things that, like, I can't decide if. If it's just straight up, like, okay, we're just grifting people, you know, like, we're just here to squeeze each any money out of anybody that we possibly can. But like, the companies that charge like $10 to withdraw when they're aggregating, like their UTX, the UTXOs they print to their batching, they pay less than the fees that I pay for a basic UTXO transaction, I'm paying 16 cent. You know, it just crazy, man. I'm just like, as soon as. As soon as I see some like that, I'm just like, you got to be kidding me.
[00:42:40] Speaker C: Yeah.
So again, I mean, I. I don't even need to go like company by company and like, name names, but, like, you look at the backgrounds of the people running these CEFI lenders and look what they were doing before. And you should, as a venture capitalist or as a customer, look at what they've done previously and have zero expectations that they would manage risk.
[00:43:05] Speaker B: Well, yeah, right.
[00:43:07] Speaker C: Like, I think Zach applied for like a junior sales role at Unchained, like, four years ago, you know, and then like happened to be in New York and met some people and said he was going to do the same thing. And it kind of grew into BlockFi. But, like, you don't think that's kind.
[00:43:21] Speaker B: Of like something that's like really just poisoned?
[00:43:24] Speaker C: Remember salt lending? Remember salt lending? That had a shitty ico. Yeah, that dude was a restaurant manager.
Right. And what was. They had like a billion dollars under management at one point or something. I don't know.
[00:43:38] Speaker B: In no time.
[00:43:39] Speaker C: What. What do you expect? I don't know. Like, I don't know. I just. I just think that, I mean, Nexo those guys came from, this was an. Basically an ICO and the whole back end was something called Credissimo, which is basically like a loan sharking business in Bulgaria. It's payday loans.
[00:43:57] Speaker B: Okay.
[00:43:58] Speaker C: So that was their business and then they did an ICO and built Nexo on top of Credissimo.
Like, do you really expect that they're going to understand risk management when it gets into the billions of dollars?
You know, so they, they appear to have escaped this time, but, you know, claims that we're nothing like Celsius, you know, really should fall on deaf ears at this point. Like the exact same business model. And, you know, you lucked out this time.
[00:44:29] Speaker B: If you kind of, if you have to say that, you're probably in a bad situation.
[00:44:33] Speaker C: Yes. So I hope people believe me. Now, as I was telling everyone to get your coins off, Celsius literally put them anywhere. And some dummies were saying, oh, well, you're just a competitor. And I was like, we are not the same business model at all. That is not what we do at Swan. That's literally not what we do. We want to have zero sats under custody. We not only don't rehypothecate. SWAN literally cannot access or touch your coins in any way. Only you can touch your coins. Even if you use a custodian, even if you use Prime Trust, your coins are owned in an individual trust account that only you can access. SWAN cannot touch your coins. And we're educating you all day long. If you're 50 and they've never done self Custody. Like, we're doing seminars and sending articles every day, every week teaching you about self custody. And you can call, like, read and yawn. And like, they'll walk you through it if you want to. Or we'll like hook you up with guy or sessions or somebody. Like, there's always. We'll hook you up with Arma and like, there's already always somebody to help you do it.
[00:45:42] Speaker B: But you don't understand, though, is that your prime audience right? There are. Are the morons who are investing in Luna and Anchor.
[00:45:51] Speaker C: Oh, my God.
[00:45:52] Speaker B: Taking on Anchor to get 10% right a month.
[00:45:56] Speaker C: Yeah. Or they have these big bags of like, company script token. Like they own cell token because they've been greedily collecting the extra 50 basis points or whatever in rewards. Because if you take it in cell token, like, you get, you get more, you know. And so like, I mean, the moral hazard here is like, if DO Kwon gets away with billions of dollars. If Pantera booked 100x by selling out of Luna when it was like, they're smart enough. Is Dan Moorhead. Like, there's smart people at Pantera. Like, they know they can figure it out. They can figure out that Luna USD anchor is a Ponzi scheme. And they made 100x. Galaxy says they profited.
Jump obviously made a ton of money. Jump is rumored to have made like 8 to 9 billion dollars profit last year.
[00:46:47] Speaker B: Dear God, man.
[00:46:48] Speaker C: So, you know, what is the reason that they wouldn't go do it again? Yeah, and again and again and again.
[00:46:55] Speaker B: I watched that video with Chamath and Chamath and what's his Face. Yeah. And they just like casually talking about. It's like, no, I got, I got. I dumped that, you know, like.
[00:47:07] Speaker C: Oh, yeah, yeah. So it was David Sacks and Chamath and they were like, hodling, they're talking about Solana last fall and they're like, you hoddling and they go, ish. Are you hodling Ish? No, of course they don't. I mean, that's a whole other thing. That's what I was saying. Like, that's the traditional Andreessen Horowitz. Use the celebrities for marketing. Put your engine behind it. Do shit ton of podcasts because they own a lot of their own media and like, put pumped the hell out of Solana all spring and summer and fall last year, you know, because they, they bought $300 million of discounted Solana from the team to give the team liquidity. And then they said, we'll buy this and then we'll Pump the hell out of it and market the hell out of it and make Solana a huge deal. Solana pumped from like 40 to 240. They all sold the top, you know, multicoin and David Sachs and all these guys, you know, got out of their cost basis plus some. Maybe they're still writing some whatever, but they've made their money. And then of course they don't care. I don't really see anything about Solana anymore. Search Solana on Twitter. Right now all you will see is just a bunch of, bunch of dumbass NFT projects. There will be no articles on Solana. Nobody from Andresen is pumping it anymore. Like the pump and dump is complete. That's what was so amazing about Luna ust Anchor and what Jump and Do Kwon pulled off is like you got rid of all of the complexity of having to market this thing. You just bribed people to give you money.
[00:48:29] Speaker B: Yeah, just give them, just split the earning, just split the, the scam rewards with them.
[00:48:36] Speaker C: Listen, they're all, they're always looking for things to disrupt out there in Silicon Valley and you know, they, these guys disrupted crypto VC and they were like, oh, we don't even need the fake marketing of you bullshit pump and dump crypto vcs. We're just gonna bribe you.
[00:48:51] Speaker B: I feel like is this, is this situation, is this environment going to get worse before it gets better, you think? Like, I mean, because a lot of people did make an excruciating amount of money off of it and there doesn't seem to be outside of just. Well, it doesn't work in Bitcoin.
[00:49:06] Speaker C: What's different, what's different this time is there are tens of thousands of plaintiffs.
[00:49:13] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:49:14] Speaker C: In particular, like Celsius has tens of thousands of plaintiffs for cases and they're going to be noisy in their jurisdictions. It is a, it's a victimless.
I guess there's, there, there's no good guy on the other side of the case. So it's a winning issue for any legislator or prosecutor to go after this because there's no one sympathetic at all on the other side. Yeah, like Mashinsky and crew are just not sympathetic at all. And everything that they did is really obvious and blatantly criminal and just risky and misrepresentation. I mean, there's like 16 different ways to get at these people, both criminally and civilly, you know, so I think that jumps to the lead spot. There was a lot of rumors about stablecoin legislation earlier in the year. I think obviously going after all these CEFI companies and all their, you know, deceptive marketing practices and irresponsible risk management and just, you know, lying in public constantly to get customers and, you know, just. There's no way that will go unpunished and there's no way it will go unregulated going forward.
[00:50:27] Speaker B: And there's already a big class action against Celsius right now, isn't there?
[00:50:30] Speaker C: I'm sure there's. There's many.
[00:50:32] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:50:33] Speaker C: And what people don't understand is, like, you don't have to finance this stuff yourself. Like, there are massive litigation funds. Like, a friend of mine has, you know, shares an office with a guy that has a billion dollar litigation fund. They're looking for things like this literally to go. And, you know, this is what they do.
[00:50:47] Speaker B: This is just.
[00:50:48] Speaker C: This is what they do. So they, they go and they, you know, they find the. They find the plaintiffs and they choose the lawyers, and the lawyers get, you know, 30%. The litigation fund, you know, puts up a little bit of money and then gets, you know, 10 of the winnings or whatever. I don't know what the economics are on it, but, you know, there's a market solution to this where if you have a claim, you can make a lot of money.
[00:51:11] Speaker B: Somebody. Somebody's making a lot of money somewhere anyway.
[00:51:16] Speaker C: So, yeah, I mean, to finish that one, like, you know, if Mashinsky goes unpunished for having gotten away with tens of millions of dollars of selling, you know, Celsius tokens over the years, you know, and he gets to keep all of that, you know, and there's no claw back here and no jail time or whatever, like, then I think there's a clear incentive for the next shady entrepreneur to do. Do it again and again and again. So, you know, until there are actually repercussions. And I'm not even saying, like, I want anybody to do jail time, whatever. I'm just saying, like, until there are actual consequences for these scams that make these people millions and billions of dollars until their actual consequences, they won't stop.
[00:51:58] Speaker B: Yeah, Yeah. I mean, it's just like, why would.
[00:52:01] Speaker C: They not do it again? Your reputation, like, even people, they clearly.
[00:52:06] Speaker B: Look at what they're doing, they don't give a shit about their reputation.
[00:52:09] Speaker C: Exactly. Like Mark. And if, then, if the Andreessen Horowitz guys like Mark Andreessen and Chris Dixon don't care about their reputations anymore because the money's so good, you know, why would you expect people that don't even have a reputation to Care about the.
[00:52:21] Speaker B: Reputation and they can buy their reputation in the next on onboarding of a bunch of noobs who have no idea what the hell's going on. Don't know anything about it.
[00:52:29] Speaker C: Exactly. I mean, Vinny Lingham is still around.
[00:52:32] Speaker B: BSV still around.
[00:52:34] Speaker C: Right.
[00:52:35] Speaker B: Craig Wright is still around.
[00:52:38] Speaker C: I don't know who that is.
[00:52:43] Speaker A: Man.
[00:52:43] Speaker B: I feel like this is, this is kind of the end game of where we are in finance is like crypto is like there's this huge contingent of gambling and this, this casino market that has blown up in the FIAT world. And crypto is like, kind of like it's, it's a magic moment of all the gambling, all the arbitrage, all the pointless tokens with nothing behind. Like just, just invent them out of thin air and create hype. It was everything. Not about. It's just remove all the equity.
[00:53:19] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:53:20] Speaker B: Remove everything that's free. Right.
[00:53:23] Speaker C: And so well stated.
[00:53:25] Speaker B: And the ICO bubbles, you know, it's, it's crazy. Like you saw some of these things get hit by the sec, like just a handful of them get hit by the sec and they paid, they paid a fine that was like a hundredth of what they made. Like, yeah, like these things made like.
[00:53:40] Speaker A: Billions of dollars and they paid like a $10 million fine.
[00:53:42] Speaker B: Who I would sign up for that. I've. I rethink myself making a shitcoin every time I hear news like that, you know.
[00:53:50] Speaker C: Yeah. I mean specifically block one sold $4 billion worth of EOS during their year long ICO and they paid a $24 million fine which is 0.6% of the proceeds. Like you pay more to a broker in almost any transaction, you know, so that you get more than that in.
[00:54:08] Speaker B: Interest just by lending out the BitMax.
[00:54:12] Speaker C: Exactly. So yeah, there's no real incentive. There's no disincentive to doing these things at present.
[00:54:21] Speaker B: Jesus.
[00:54:22] Speaker C: Anyway, again, you shouldn't go a full year. No, I think these stories are going to continue. I think there's more we should get JC on again next time. I really want to probe more on the way JC talks about crypto and defi trying to like from scratch, completely reinvent the wheel that is the natural evolution of financial contracts since 1300s.
[00:54:48] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:54:49] Speaker C: So basically he's got this whole thing that I've only gotten bits of pieces of. But Basically the last 700 years has been the natural market evolution of how to deal with the information asymmetry inherent in financial contracts. Alan Farrington obviously is big on this as well.
[00:55:02] Speaker B: He's big on that.
[00:55:03] Speaker C: Yeah, I have a whole spiel on it too, that I've kind of developed just about. About how to think about the hypocrisy inherent in crypto. People calling for no regulation of crypto while sitting here in the cushy regulated American markets, the American capitalist system that, you know, greatly benefits from the regulation and the contract law that underpins the healthiest financial markets and the most secure financial markets that we've ever had in the history of the world.
And so, you know, the, the TLDR is like, you can have like Pierre Richard does like an ANCAP approach and say, like, I'd rather get rid of all regulation and let the market, you know, come up with solutions of, you know, self regulation or societies or, you know, badges of accreditation or whatever and have it just like have the government out of it, that's fine. But 700 years of evolution trying to let people do that so far resulted in what we've got. And you can't go from where we are to tearing down and going to zero.
And so at least under the framework where we are, it seems like the hypocrisy of like, not having regulation on crypto shitcoin stuff, but having regulation on Ponzi schemes targeting your grandma and, you know, not being able to like, like, why should Richard Hart be able to send mailers to nursing homes about Hex, but penny stocks can't send mailers about their penny stock to nursing homes.
[00:56:41] Speaker B: Yeah, right. When penny stocks are arguably better than a lot less of a problem than he.
[00:56:47] Speaker C: A lot better.
[00:56:48] Speaker B: Right?
[00:56:49] Speaker C: Yeah. And you can't, you can't advertise, you know, you can't advertise your, your startup C round on the side of a bus, but you can advertise shitcoin on the side of a bus or the back of a magazine, you know, with, with Vinnie and lance bass and Mr. Wonderful's nice, nice faces on the back page of magazines pumping some shitcoin, you know.
[00:57:08] Speaker B: Did you see Raul's face? Did you, did you watch the video.
[00:57:11] Speaker C: Of Raul when you found out that. When he found out peg broke.
[00:57:15] Speaker B: That was my favorite thing for like 48 hours.
[00:57:18] Speaker C: Yeah. Yeah, man. Well, listen, there's another thing I'm kind of, I think is a really great, great lesson for everyone in the bitcoin media space, which is that when you choose a sponsor, you are becoming partners with that sponsor and you are endorsing that sponsor. It's literally an endorsement deal and you are lending your brand's credibility to that Sponsor. So choose your sponsors. Well, I think that people understand that those sponsors are making you rich and that, you know, the shadier the sponsor, the more they're willing to pay for your credibility.
[00:58:02] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:58:02] Speaker C: And it is really short term greedy to work with sponsors that you have not diligenced or that are, you know, dealing with crypto. Crypto exchanges, whatever. Like think about it. You know, you're very careful with the sponsors you take. They're all products that you use and people.
[00:58:23] Speaker B: I just say no 99% of the time. And I just reach out to people that the companies I use and I have been using forever, you know.
[00:58:29] Speaker C: Exactly. And I, I look forward to that being a clear litmus test for bitcoin podcasters and people with, with bitcoin shows versus shitcoin people like choose your sponsors, choose your business partners. We as the media consumers expect you to stand behind the sponsors that pay you.
[00:58:53] Speaker B: Yeah.
[00:58:54] Speaker C: So honestly I can't even not naming names and everything, but I think that.
[00:58:59] Speaker B: Everybody knows there's a lot of, there's.
[00:59:01] Speaker C: A lot of responsibility that comes along with taking a sponsor. And I think people have been just way too willy nilly about it. And you know, I totally agree. I just, it's just the benefit of. I'm thinking about it a lot because we're going to start having sponsors on Swan shows.
[00:59:19] Speaker B: Ah, right.
[00:59:20] Speaker C: So we're going to start having ads on Swan Signal Live and on Hard Money and some of these other shows.
[00:59:26] Speaker A: And post me, post me your.
[00:59:29] Speaker B: Your price. I'll give you back your money. Your money. Bitcoin Audible to promote. To promote the fact.
[00:59:35] Speaker C: Nice.
Yeah, we can do trades, ease and stuff too. Little, little readers. Yeah, for sure, sure. Done. Look, look, we're doing business right now anyway. All right. I got to run.
[00:59:45] Speaker B: You put money in Celsius, you would have known.
[00:59:48] Speaker C: You would have.
[00:59:48] Speaker B: You'd been listening to Cory.
[00:59:50] Speaker C: All right, man, I got to hop.
[00:59:52] Speaker B: Later, man. Appreciate it.
[00:59:54] Speaker C: Okay.
[00:59:54] Speaker A: A huge thank you to Corey Clipston for coming on the show. Seriously, thank you, man. And for everybody listening, do not forget to subscribe to the ShitCoin Insider feed. I know you're probably listen on Bitcoin Audible, but if you haven't subscribed to Shitcoin Insider, make sure you do so you don't miss the next episode, which is already recorded and will be on the way this week. Probably maximum maximalism with the shitcoin Insider. The insider joins us back on the show finally and you're not going to want to miss it. Also, thank you to the sponsors who technically do not sponsor this show, but I like to thank them anyway because obviously I love the companies, but I also just would not have the time or resources to keep this show alive without them. Or Bitcoin Audible really, but they are Coinkite the solution to all of your Bitcoin hardware problems. Swan Bitcoin for auto stacking and literally learning and exploring everything you want to know about Bitcoin and the Fold card for sats back on everything in your life. If you want to ensure that you stack every single day, use the satsback Fold debit card. Thanks for listening everybody and I will catch you on the next episode of shitcoin Insider.
[01:01:15] Speaker B: This podcast is a part of the C Suite Radio Network. For more top business podcasts, visit c-suiteradio.com.
